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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920096-CA 
v ; Priority 2 
GARY L. STARNES : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
EPirF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE 01 PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a restitution judgment in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court
 A\ ;>.,- *. ; Washington County, State 
r.f Utah, the Honorable Jam^ 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
".. - presented on appeal i 
court's decision to accept 
defendant's proposed testimonial evidence by proffer, instead of 
a 11 ow i . :!i it' s M :i ti lesses t " + raestify " ] :i v e," dei ly defendant 
either constitutional right ^ • due process or his right to a 
full hearing on the issue of restitution as required under Utah 
Code 0) i" These • !ie 
interpretation constitutional and statutory provisions. 
Consequently, both present questions of law that are reviewed 
1 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Mitchell, 824 
P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 
(Utah App. 1991). 
2. Did the trial court properly impose restitution? 
The decision of whether to impose restitution lies within the 
solid discretion of the trial court. State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 
929, 936 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 
1992); State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are set forth in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with criminal mischief, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990), 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102 (1990), and criminal trespass, also a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i) 
(R. 5-6). The information was later amended, and defendant was 
charged with criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990), assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990), 
and criminal trespass, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i) (R. 10-11). On January 7, 
1991, defendant pled guilty to the first two charges, and the 
criminal trespass charge was dismissed. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to one year of probation, ordered defendant 
2 
to pay fines totaling $600.00/ and retained jurisdiction on the 
question of restitution for the victim (R. 2 ) . 
On August 7r 19 91, the State filed a motion for 
restitution judgment on behalf of the victim (R. 16). Notice of 
a hearing on the motion was served .-i! d"i|:o,n'1 jrii.'" s pilaee of 
business 'F iQ), am1, on August 30, 1991, restitution hearing 
was held 55 at Neither defendant nor his counsel 
appeared - 1M : , and the Uric * . ' entei'erll a 
restitution judgment against defendant the amount of $281.89, 
the amount of actual damages itemized by the victim (R. 18, 21; 
By October 29, 1991, defendant had made no effort to 
make restitution, and the State filed a motion for an order to 
show cause (R 22) . The coi in t: Issued tl i,e order, and set a 
hearing for November 8, 199 3 (R. 23). Defendant was personally 
served and ordered * appear at that hearing (R. 24). The 
hearing was held c - scheduled, and defendant appeared without 
counsel (R. 5 7 at
 #. Defendant explained that he d id not know 
about the original restitution hearing because hv h<ui been in 
Illinois for several months (R. He further 
challenged the amount of restitution ordered and requested 
another restitution hearinc 
original restitution order .earing for November 13, 
1991 (R 45, 57 at 7) 
At: Hit/'1 ip'lovembei M , i^ lfl hi-jai, i nq, Merendanr. again 
appeared without counsel and explained that his attorney was 
3 
engaged in a trial in Salt Lake City (R. 56 at 3-5). Although no 
appearance of counsel had been filed, defendant moved for a 
continuance on the basis of his counsel's inability to attend the 
hearing (R. 45, R. 56 at 3-5). Noting that the victim was 
present and prepared to testify, the court denied defendant's 
motion for a continuance (R, 56 at 5). The court explained to 
defendant that it would hear the victim's testimony, allow 
defendant to ask questions and would make a ruling on that basis 
(R. 56 at 5). However, the court emphasized that it would not 
sign any restitution judgment for thirty days so that defendant's 
counsel could review transcripts of the hearing and object to the 
proposed order if defendant so desired (R. 56 at 5, 14, 18). At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that restitution 
in the amount of $450.00 was appropriate and again explained that 
it would allow defendant's counsel thirty days to object to the 
restitution judgment before it was signed by the court (R. 29, 56 
at 17-18). 
On December 11, 1991, defendant, through his present 
counsel, objected to the unsigned restitution judgment and 
requested yet another restitution hearing (R. 30-31). A hearing 
was held on January 8, 1992 (R. 58), after which the court 
entered its findings on the record and ordered defendant to pay 
$450.00 in restitution (R. 44-47; R. 58 at 13-17). The court's 
final restitution judgment was entered on January 16, 1992, and 
it is from that order that defendant appeals (R. 44-47, 49). (A 
4 
copy of the trial court's order is attached hereto as addendum 
A.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to the issues presented on appeal 
appear in the Statement of the Case and Argument sections of this 
brief.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the 
trial court violated his right to due process and his r4^ht to a 
full hearing on the issue of restitution when it decidea to 
accept his proposed testimonial evidence by proffer, instead of 
allowing defendant's witnesses to testify at the restitution 
hearing. Neither issue was preserved below, and, consequently, 
defendant has waived those claims on appeal. Moreover, defendant 
has failed to cite any authority to support his assertions. 
Finally, even if this Court were to consider the merits of 
defendant's claims, the record makes clear that the trial court 
afforded defendant ample opportunity to present evidence. 
Indeed, the trial court admitted and considered all of 
defendant's evidence. 
Finally, although the trial court could have more 
clearly stated its reasons on the record for imposing 
1
 Because defendant has not provided a transcript of the 
hearing at which his guilty plea was taken, the State is unable 
to provide a recitation of the facts underlying defendant's 
conviction. However, because defendant challenges only the 
restitution judgment, and not his conviction, the record that 
defendant has provided on appeal appears to be adequate for a 
resolution of the issues raised. 
5 
restitution, it did provide a sufficient basis for its decision. 
Moreover, there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the imposition of restitution, and defendant has not even 
asserted that he was prejudiced by the trial court's alleged 
failure to comply with the requirements of Utah's restitution 




THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO ADDRESS 
DEFENDANT'S "DUE PROCESS" CLAIMS BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE THOSE CLAIMS 
BELOW# AND HE HAS FAILED TO CITE ANY 
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT HIS ASSERTIONS ON 
APPEAL. 
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the 
trial court violated his due process rights under the state and 
federal constitutions when it refused to allow defendant to put 
on "live witnesses" instead of accepting the proposed testimony 
of defendant's witnesses by proffer. Br. of Appellant at 8-12. 
Defendant, in essence, asserts that because the State was allowed 
to have the victim testify "live" at the November 13, 1991 
restitution hearing, defendant was denied his right to due 
process when the court accepted defendant's proposed testimonial 
evidence by proffer at the January 8, 1992 hearing instead of 
allowing defendant's witnesses to testify "live" for purposes of 
"persuasion." Br. of Appellant at 10. As demonstrated below, 
defendant never objected to the trial court's decision to accept 
proffered testimony instead of having defendant's witnesses 
6 
testify. Defendant's claim was therefore waived. See State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) ("[Utah appellate 
courts] normally will not consider issues, even constitutional 
ones, that have not been presented first to the trial court for 
its consideration and resolution."). 
At the January 8, 1992 restitution hearing, defendant's 
counsel told the court that he planned to call two witnesses who 
would testify on the issue of damages suffered by the victim (R. 
58 at 11). The trial court requested a proffer, and defense 
counsel provided an account of the proposed testimony2 (R. 58 at 
11-13). The trial court accepted the proffer as given (R. 58 at 
16), and it made extensive findings from the bench (R. 58 at 13-
16). After the trial court held that it would order defendant to 
pay $450.00 in restitution, the following exchange occurred 
between the court and defense counsel: 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. BISHOP: Am I understanding that you accept the 
proffer as given? 
THE COURT: I accept the proffer as given. 
2
 Defendant's first proposed witness was defendant himself, 
who intended to testify that he did not damage any of the 
victim's property and that the victim was simply trying to "stick 
it to [him]" (R. 58 at 11-12). Defendant's second proposed 
witness was Richard Madsen, who would have testified that he went 
to the victim's house because he hopec to prevent an altercation. 
Madsen also would have testified that although there was a 
"scuffle," he restrained defendant and that he observed no damage 
to the victim's property (R. 58 at 12-13). 
7 
MR. BISHOP: May I call the witnesses for purposes of 
the persuasiveness of that proffer? 
THE COURT: No counsel. 
MR. BISHOP: Okay. 
THE COURT: Rule 1101 does not give you that privilege 
under the circumstances. That's where we stand. 
MR. BISHOP: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. 
R. 58 at 16-17. 
It is clear from the record that defendant never 
objected to the court's refusal to allow his witnesses to 
testify. Defendant did not question the basis for the court's 
ruling, nor did he challenge the court's ruling on due process 
grounds. Defendant's "due process" claims are therefore waived, 
and this Court should not indulge defendant by entertaining his 
arguments for the first time on appeal. See State v. Johnson,. 
774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("[A]s we have repeatedly stated, 
'A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is 
that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal.' Importantly, the grounds for the objection must be 
distinctly and specifically stated." (citations omitted)). 
Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
8 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988). Defendant fails to cite any authority in 
support of his assertion that if one party is allowed to put on 
"live" evidence, due process requires that the other party 
likewise be allowed to have witnesses testify live for 
"persuasive" purposes. Defendant also fails to cite any 
authority to support his assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(1990) required the trial court to allow his witnesses to testify 
instead of accepting that testimonial evidence through proffer. 
This Court should therefore reject defendant's claims. See State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since defendant 
fails to support [his] argument by any legal analysis or 
authority, we decline to rule on it."). 
Defendant also claims that "[w]hen the initial 
restitution order was entered without notice to 
Defendant/Appellant, the restitution amount was $281.69, even 
though damages found only came to $268.59." Br. of Appellant at 
10. Defendant's claim is misplaced. First, notice of the 
hearing was mailed to defendant in care of the Black Swan 
Restaurant, a business owned by defendant and the address listed 
on the arrest warrant for defendant (R. 9, 16-17). Even 
defendant acknowledged that notice of the original hearing was 
probably sent to "[his] Utah address," but asserted that he did 
not know about the hearing because he was in Illinois (R. 57 at 
2-5). However, defendant never provided the court with a 
different address or any notice that he had changed his address 
9 
(R. 57 at 3). Consequently, defendant's assertion that the 
original hearing was held without notice to him is not accurate. 
As the trial court recognized, although defendant did not receive 
notice, notice was served (R. 44; R. 57 at 4-5). As for 
defendant's assertion that the original restitution order was for 
$281.69, even though the amount of damages found was only 
$268.59, the actual damages itemized for the trial court in the 
victim's letter totaled $281.69 (R. 18). While it appears that 
the victim may have made an arithmetic error, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that either the victim, the State or the 
trial court was aware of the mistake. Of course, in the final 
analysis defendant's complaints are moot because the trial court, 
at defendant's request, set aside the original restitution 
judgment, and set another restitution hearing (R. 45). 
Nevertheless, defendant complains that he was penalized 
because "[a]fter [he] attempted to have a restitution hearing, 
the amount [of the restitution judgment] jumped [from $281.69] to 
$450.00 without any explanation and without any new evidence." 
Br. of Appellant at 10. Defendant's assertion is misplaced; 
there was new evidence to support the increase in the amount of 
restitution ordered. Specifically, the original restitution 
order only covered the cost of repairing several items damaged by 
defendant and the value of those items that could not be repaired 
(R. 18). However, at the November 13, 1991 restitution hearing, 
the victim explained that it was not possible to restore some of 
the damaged items, including an antique table and two floor 
10 
lamps, to their original condition (R. 56 at 7-9). Consequently, 
the value of some of the items damaged by defendant was 
diminished3, and those losses in value were not reflected in the 
original restitution order (R. 18; R. 56 at 7-9). This Court 
should therefore rebuff defendant's insinuation that the trial 
court penalized him for requesting a restitution hearing. 
Even if this Court were inclined to address any of the 
assertions made by defendant in points I and II of his brief, 
those claims lack merit. As demonstrated in the Statement of the 
Case section of this brief, defendant was given several 
opportunities to put on evidence in his favor, and the court did 
in fact receive all of defendant's proposed evidence (R. 58 at 
11-14). Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertions, the court 
did explain what weight it accorded the evidence presented by 
both the State and defendant (R. 58 at 14-16). Br. of Appellant 
at 10. 
Finally, defendant's assertion that he was "denied 
access to counsel" because he was given only five days notice of 
the second restitution hearing and was therefore unable to obtain 
3
 For instance, the victim paid $1000.00 for the antique 
table some fifteen years earlier, and it is likely that the table 
had increased in value over that fifteen year period. Although 
the table was repaired, it could not be fully restored (R. 56 at 
7-9). 
The victim also provided a letter from Stephen Roth, 
the person who repaired the lamps and table that were broken by 
defendant. In that letter, Roth explained that he was unable to 
fully restore the damaged items and that the value of the antique 
table was "lessoned [sic] considerably by the damage and the 
addition of 'modern' repair parts" (Plaintiffs Exhibit #6). (A 
copy of Exhibit #6 is attached hereto as Addendum B.) 
11 
counsel ignores the circumstances of this case. Br. of Appellant 
at 11. The record makes clear that at the November 8, 1991 
hearing on the State's motion for an order to show cause, at 
which defendant appeared without counsel, the restitution hearing 
was set for November 13, 1991 in order to accommodate defendant's 
travel itinerary (R. 57 at 7). Defendant did not complain that 
five days was an insufficient amount to time in which to obtain 
counsel. Although defendant's counsel was unable to appear at 
the November 13, 1991 hearing and the court elected to hear the 
victim's testimony instead of granting defendant's motion for a 
continuance, defendant did appear with counsel at the January 8, 
1992 hearing. Counsel indicated at that hearing that he had 
reviewed the transcripts from the earlier restitution proceedings 
(R. 58 at 3-5, 9-11). Presumably, if defendant felt the need to 
clarify any of the victim's testimony, he would have had the 
victim subpoenaed to appear at the January 8, 1992 hearing. 
Under the circumstances, defendant's claim that he was denied the 
opportunity to obtain counsel lacks merit.4 
A
 Defendant's second claim on appeal, that he was denied his 
right to a full restitution hearing as guaranteed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (1990), is little more than a regurgitation 
of his "due process" claim. For the reasons discussed above, 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED RESTITUTION. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion when 
it ordered defendant to pay the victim $450.00 in restitution. 
See State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1992); State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 
420 (Utah 1987) (the decision of whether to impose restitution 
lies within the discretion of the trial court). Under Utah law: 
When a person is adjudged guilty of 
criminal activity which has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution up to 
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the 
victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted, 
or to the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court unless the court in applying 
the criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that 
restitution is inappropriate. Whether the 
court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall 
make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) (1990) (emphasis added). 
Subsection (3)(b) reads as follows: 
(b) In determining whether or not to 
order restitution, or restitution which is 
complete, partial, or nominal, the court 
shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the 
defendant and the burden payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to 
the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant 
to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed 
by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on 
the defendant of the payment of 
13 
restitution and the method of payment; 
and 
(iv) other circumstances which the 
court determines make restitution 
inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(b) (1990). Defendant's assertion 
that the trial court did not comply with the requirements of the 
statute because it failed to make findings with respect to its 
reasons for ordering restitution is premised on a 
misinterpretation of the statute. There is no language in the 
statute that requires a trial court to enter full formal findings 
on the record. Haston, 811 P.2d at 936. However, as this Court 
also recognized in Haston, "the court must declare reasons within 
the statutory framework for awarding or denying restitution. A 
statement in the nature of findings which adequately apprises a 
reviewing court of the trial court's reasoning is minimally 
required." Id. 
In announcing that it would impose restitution, the 
trial court made the following comment: 
,f[T]he Court has the authority to order 
restitution in an amount double the claimed 
damage. I take your math at face value, 
counsel, and find that the actual damage, 
when totaling up all of the exhibits5, is in 
the neighborhood of $260. I could order 
restitution in as much as $520. I do not 
find that appropriate. But I do find 
restitution appropriate under the facts of 
these cases, these circumstances, the 
hearings prior to [today] and today. Four 
5
 The exhibits referred to by the trial court were documents 
supporting the victim's valuation of the items damaged by 
defendant and the cost of repairs. They are numbered Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 - 9 and are included in the court record. 
14 
hundred and fifty dol ri:. is n lie,1 resti. t, ill lun 
judgment, 
R • 58 \lthouq 11 i 1 ma y have ibp<:« n pi e 1 erabl e ^n> "| f. I in '"im r I 
t reasons for ordering restitution greater 
detaii failure- lo do so is,, at - harmless error. See 
State Stayer, 706 m\7d I II, i II 
the mandate o* statute that the trial cour reasons be 
included as part relieve that the failure to do 
so in this case ample record 
evidence to support ordering restitution],"), 
The record makes clear that the victim suffered $260 , !"/» 
in actual damr cigure does 
not account diminished value \ - : :!. items damaged 
defendant that could » 1 * restored : uieir orininal 
t Llie rrmT~h ' _ 
determination that $450. i appropriate amount 
restitution. Certainly, the * * uourt acted 
defendant concedes, could have 
ordered restitution • r double the amount damages of 
Appellant While defendar t 
d b u i in in for ordering restitution i i I an amount 
greater than the amount of actual damages, cites luthority 
support of that proposition and there 
court to basis alone, 
this Court should reject defendant's argument. See Amicone, 689 
P
 9 2Q £|"t j. j t T • 
15 
Finally, with respect to defendant's assertion that the 
trial court did not make any findings with respect to the 
criteria identified under subsection (3)(b), the statute itself 
requires only that "the court shall take [those factors] into 
account." § 76-3-201(3)(b). Although the trial court did not 
conduct an inquiry into the various factors, it is apparent that 
the court believed defendant would not be burdened by the order 
of restitution. Not only did defendant own the Black Swan 
Restaurant, but he had retained private counsel. Moreover, 
defendant himself told the court that he owned a piece of 
property in Springdale, Utah that was valued at approximately 
$200,000 (R. 57 at 6). Consequently, although the court should 
have perhaps discussed the factors identified in subsection 
(3)(b) more fully on the record, it is reasonable to believe that 
the court concluded defendant would not be burdened by an order 
to pay $450.00 in restitution. More importantly, however, 
defendant has not even alleged that he was prejudiced by the 
trial court's failure to make findings related to § 76-3-
201(3)(b). See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Utah 
1983) (defendant must contend that error was harmful). 
Because there is ample evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's restitution judgment, and because 
defendant does not contend that the trial court's alleged failure 
to consider the factors identified in § 76-3-201(3)(b) prejudiced 
his case, this Court should deem any failure on the part of the 
trial court to more fully state its reasons for imposing 
16 
restitution harmless error Should this Court conclude 
otherwise - proper remedy remand the easi-i ! m the ontiy 
c necessary, farther proceedings 
-. of restitutio Haston, 811 P. 2d at 937, 
CONCLUSION 
regoing reasons, the trial courts imposition 
~* restitution should be affirmed, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/o*Qf^. ^} o-^ c*-~ 
TODD A. UTjriNGPK^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RESTITUTION 
JUDGMENT 
f 
Criminal No. 9010016/04 
The above-entitled matter ha\ : befor 
for heard Defendant '«. t d i jer r signed Resti:. _:.. , 
Pi aim iff State of Utah appearing through .• 
counsel, Wade Farrawa*. Deputy Washington Coun* 
the Defendant through 1.. counsel, 
Bishop, and the Court having reviewed files and 
records action, including the rest . f 
August oi aving heard the arguments 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes 
and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusion;;, of, h niv: 
1. a notice of the original 
hearing on Plaintiff's motion restitution judgment, which 
hearing was held August 30, 1991, a I" hirh h ••; ail no Defendant was 
nol preseril , AJU, i hearing, the Court entered a Restitution 
Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $281,89. 
2. When no payments on said judgment had been received, 
Defendant was served with an Order to Show Cause requiring him to 
appear on November 8, 1991, to show cause why payments had not 
been made. 
3. At the November 8, 1991, Defendant, who was present 
without counsel, requested that the Court set aside the 
restitution judgment in the amount of $281.89 and hold another 
hearing on the amount of restitution to be paid. 
4. The Court granted Defendant's motion, set aside the 
$281.89 judgment, and set a second restitution hearing for 
November 13, 1992. 
5. Defendant was present in person at the November 13, 
1991, hearing, and at the time of hearing advised the Court that 
his attorney could not be present and requested a continuance. 
The Court noted that no appearance of counsel had been filed and 
denied Defendant's motion for continuance, and the restitution 
hearing was held. 
6. At the November 13, 1991, hearing, Phillip Kent 
Bimstein, the victim in this action, presented testimony and 
written evidence as to the amount of damages caused by Defendant, 
which the Court found persuasive. 
7. At the January 8, 1992, hearing, Defendant's counsel 
made a proffer of the testimony of Defendant's witness concerning 
the cause of the damages for which restitution is sought. The 
Court also admitted a letter from Dale Dockstaker to the 
Defendant offered in mitigation of damages to the victim's front 
door. 
45 
8, The Court determined that a hearing on restitution is a 
sentencing proceeding, 
. 9. The t "ourt stated that Rule 1101 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides that sentencing proceedings the Rules ox 
Evidence are stayed, be 
2 ecei.i e> 3 and considered. 
10 The Court determined that victim, Phillip Kent 
Bimstein, suffered a :;t t id,] d< , i iiJiciiyt J s -«? a 
i Defendan criminal activity. 
1 Tne - noted that las authorit 
an amount c .. imount of 
damages. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. 1v notice of the restitution 
hearings action. 
Pursuant to Rule 1101 
considered Defendant's proferred evidence 
causation and mitigation of damages, as well as reviewing 
the testimony of Phillip Kent Bimstein < m > 'i nil MMI.I n r 
making ruling. 
The amount of $450.00 is a reasonable and justifiable 
amount of restitution this matter. 
^regoing Finding! ••r*- and Conclusions of Law, 
the Court now makes and enters its 
RESTITUTION JUDGMENT 
HEREBY ORDERED that a restitution judgment is entered 
against the Defendant, GARY STARNES, and in favor 
Bimstein, in the amount of Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($450.00). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said restitution shall be paid 
through the Washington County Attorney's Office. 
DATED this /ft day of January, 1992. 
JApE^ST. SHUMATE 
Dg&RICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, JAY B. HOLT, Clerk of said District Court in and for 
Washington County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
Honorable James L. Shumate, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly 
commissioned and qualified, and the signature of said Judge to 
said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Restitution 
Judgment 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the Court this day of January, 1992. 




£ ; ^  "s , .•>•• amount of Four Hundred Fifty TV". ' 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said restitution shall be paid 
through t: Washington e. 
• of January, 1992. rf rr- -DATE UL 
-'JA>1E§X£T. SHUMATE. v • .;. , 
-»'V 
CERTIFICATION 




Yb **«." *'"'' '* ^ ' <? 
ss. 
) 
sale Distri • r 
nereby cert~: ;„G: the 
Honorable James Shumate, whose name * subscribed r. 
preceding certificate :s *r-=-- "::•:— * :-* c
 :,T-
commissi on t'.d ana quai 1 i . . . • ignature , \ "r-:^ *^ to 
said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Restitution 
Judgment 
I hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal the Court this day January, 1992. 
JAY B. HOLT, pLERK 
By C 
DEPUTY \CL: 
Approved as to form and content: 
S t e r i « g ^ 
Willard R. Bishop 






g November 13,1991 
To whom it may concern: 
I billed Phillip Bimstein $125.00 to work on 
broken lamps and a broken dining table. 
The table was an extendable leaf type and the wooden 
extension slides underneath were an antique dovetail con-
struction. 50fo of the slides were shattered and I replaced 
them. These slides are not just to accommodate the extension 
feature of the table, they are the primary structural 
member that holds the table together. One of the table 
legs was broken and the surface of the table had some dents 
which were obviously recent. Typically on such woodworking 
repairs I do the minimum of work because IJm usually afraid 
the customer won't understand how long my work takes and 
will be shocked by a high bill. I should also mention I 
didn't have the time in my schedule to spend more time on the 
project. Consequently, the table was just repaired to the 
point that it could be uprighted and used. However, the 
table's condition is not as good as original and its value 
was lessoned considerably by the damage and the addition of 
"modern" repair parts. 
The damaged lamps I worked on were of a very hightech 
design and had some key plastic parts that were damaged. I 
attempted to repair them with the addition of some superficial 
metal screws however I wouldn't guarantee how long they'll 
last. It was impossible to make the lamps as good as they were 
originally. ^ ^ ^ 
P.O. Box 211 Springdale, UTAH 84767 
